This paper studies career concerns in teams where the support a worker receives depends on fellow team members'e¤ort and ability. In this setting, by exerting e¤ort and providing support, a worker can in ‡uence her own and her teammates'performances in order to bias the learning process in her favor. To manipulate the market's assessments, we argue that in equilibrium, a worker has incentives to help or even sabotage her colleagues in order to signal that she is of higher ability. In a multiperiod stationary framework, we show that the stationary level of work e¤ort is above and help e¤ort is below their e¢ cient levels. We also examine career concerns with explicit contracts.
Introduction
Modern corporations launch innovative employment practices in the workplace, including teamwork, job rotation and problem-solving groups, to raise productivity and pro…ts.
1 However, providing team incentives creates challenges. Workers, who may be subject to explicit incentives that arise from compensation contracts, may also be involved in productive activities for free. A prominent example is the development of open source software. 2 Top programmers contribute freely to this process because there are delayed rewards (Lerner & Tirole (2002) ). They have implicit incentives that arise from career concerns; i.e., concerns about the e¤ect of reputation on external labor markets and thus on future remuneration. 3 In the open source mode, the market can see outcomes and whether the problem was addressed in a clever way (Von Hippel & Von Krogh (2003) ). 4 In turn, a programmer is able to signal her talent to peers and prospective employers, thereby increasing future monetary payments. However, due to the collaborative nature of this activity (Weber (2004) ), the individual outcome also depends on the contribution and thus the qualities of fellow team members.
This paper studies career concerns in teams where the support a worker receives depends on fellow team members'e¤ort and ability. We address the questions of how the learning process about a worker's ability is shaped by teamwork interactions and how career concerns arise in this setting.
A worker's e¤ort and ability are inputs in her teammates'production functions. Thus, by exerting e¤ort and providing support, a worker can in ‡uence her own and her teammates'performances in order to manipulate the market's assessments about her own ability. We argue that in equilibrium, a worker has incentives either to help or even to sabotage her colleagues, in order to bias the learning process in her favor. The existing literature on career concerns in teams, based on Auriol, Friebel & Pechlivanos (2002) , assumes that a teammate's support depends exclusively on her teammates'e¤ort (not ability). The learning process about a worker's ability is therefore independent of the quality of fellow team members and her career concerns depend exclusively on her own performance.
We employ Holmström's (1982 Holmström's ( , 1999 career concerns framework, in which neither the workers nor the market know workers'innate abilities and both learn from past performances. We consider 1 The 5th European Working Conditions Survey (2012) reports that the pace of respondents' work depends on direct control of their boss (43% in all workplaces), production or performance targets (47%), and work done by colleagues (45%). The 2011 Workplace Employment Relations Study about British workplaces …nds that the incidence of methods for knowledge transmission and teamwork interactions are considerable; i.e., meetings involving all sta¤ (in 80% of workplaces), team brie…ngs (60%) and problem solving groups (14%).
2 Apache, Linux, Perl and Sendmail, among others, are developed as open source software. The national value of Europe's investment in free/libre/open-source (FLOSS) software in 2006 is 22 billion euros representing 20.5% of total software investment. In USA, this value is 36 billion (in euros) (Ghosh (2007) ). 3 Explicit incentives to perform a job or a task are provided through explicit contractual commitments by a principal. However, implicit incentives arise when principals competing in a labor market have some ex post discretion how to respond to an agent's performance. This agent has implicit incentives to change her current e¤ort in order to in ‡uence the learning process about her ability and thus increase her future payments. 4 The Apache project makes a point of recognizing all contributors on its website, http://httpd.apache.org/contributors/#colm. Kogut & Metiu (2000) state that many programmers reportedly believe that being a member of the LINUX community "commands a $10,000 premium on annual wages". Hann, Roberts, Slaughter & Fielding (2004) argue that star programmers are an order of magnitude more productive than their peers, so there is much to signal. a simple setting with two agents who work and interact for two periods. Agents consider work and help as two separate tasks, and have task-speci…c cost functions. A worker's "project" output is observable and linear in her own innate ability and "work" e¤ort, her teammate's support, and a transitory shock. The support a teammate provides also depends on her own "help" e¤ort and ability; i.e., the teammate's ability matters for an agent's performance. Agents' abilities and the transitory shocks are independently and normally distributed. Additionally, we consider di¤erent degrees of initiated and received teamwork interactions; i.e., the fraction of a teammate's support that is appropriated by an agent may di¤er from the fraction of an agent's help that increases a teammate's production.
The dependence of future rewards on past performances plays a key role in agents'labor supply.
The market draws inferences about the levels of agents'abilities via current project outputs. Since labor is a substitute for ability, an agent can in ‡uence the learning process in her favor by distorting both her e¤orts upwards. 5 What complicates inferences is that because both teammates'abilities are inputs in the production function, an agent's project output as a signal of her own ability is noisier.
However, her colleague's output also conveys information.
By exerting work and help e¤ort, an agent can in ‡uence both performance measures and manipulate market perceptions. If the initiated interactions are strong enough relative to the received interactions so that an agent's support has a great impact on her colleague's production, the market attributes high performance by a teammate to the agent's ability and revises its assessment about the ability upwards. In this case, we argue that an agent has incentives to work and help her colleague in order to build up her reputation. The opposite occurs if received interactions are strong enough relative to initiated interactions. High performance by a teammate is attributed to the teammate's ability. This causes the market to put a negative weight on that performance when forecasting an agent's ability. In this case, an agent's help will increase the teammate's performance further, which biases the learning process against her. Thus, an agent now has incentives to sabotage her colleague.
She can induce an upward revision of her own ability only by destroying some part of her teammate's production.
This analysis shows that what matters for career concerns is how many components of the production and learning process an agent can a¤ect in order to shape the market's assessments. An agent cashes in a reputational bonus that increases with e¤ort exertion and support provision or sabotage. Holmström (1982) studies career concerns when there are no interactions, while Auriol et al. (2002) assume that the support an agent receives depends exclusively on her colleague's e¤ort. In their model, by looking at a teammate's performance, the market cannot draw any additional information about an agent's ability. The process of inference about each teammate's ability is independent and 5 Empirical studies …nd evidence for the existence of career concerns for professionals (Gibbons & Murphy (1992) ), and for economists (Coupe, Smeets & Warzynski (2006) ); i.e., past performance and the probability of promotion are positively related, and the sensitivity of promotion to performance declines with experience, indicating the presence of a learning process. Borland (1992) provides a survey. the quality of fellow team members has no e¤ect on an agent's reputation incentives. This paper also investigates Fama's (1980) conjecture that career concerns induce agents to behave e¢ ciently. Holmström (1999) formalizes this idea by considering a "stationary" single-agent model where ability is not …xed but ‡uctuates over time, thereby preventing the market from fully learning its level. He states that if there is no discounting, Fama's result is correct: agents exert the e¢ cient level of work e¤ort. We argue that in a multi-agent model where there are teamwork interactions and the quality of fellow team members matters for an agent's decisions, this result does not necessarily hold. In particular, if initiated interactions occur, even though there is no discounting, the stationary work e¤ort is higher and help e¤ort lower than their e¢ cient levels. Because we add noise to the learning process, both performance measures become more vague. An agent can more e¤ectively shape the market's assessments by increasing her own project output, and thus the work e¤ort is distorted upwards, while the help e¤ort is distorted downwards. The balance between the reputation incentives in a stationary model indicates that an agent is oriented to focus on tasks that increase her own project output, dragging her attention from helping or sabotaging her teammate. In a stationary equilibrium, career concerns induce an agent to over-provide work e¤ort. An agent's stationary e¤ort levels are e¢ cient only in two cases, provided that there is no discounting. On the one hand, this happens as long as an agent's ability is not an input in her teammate's production function as in the settings of Holmström (1999) and Auriol et al. (2002) , although received interactions may occur. A teammate's output as a performance measure should not convey any information about an agent's ability and hence has no e¤ect on reputation incentives. In this case, the supplied work e¤ort is e¢ cient regardless of the intensity of received interactions, and thus of how noisy the signal of an agent's performance is about her own ability. Exerting zero help e¤ort is also e¢ cient. On the other hand, e¢ cient e¤ort levels are obtained in a stationary setting as long as both initiated and received interactions are perfect, implying that agent's work and help e¤orts need to be equally productive.
We extend the analysis to examine team incentives when explicit contracts are provided. We consider a risk-neutral principal who appoints two risk-averse agents whose individual outputs are observable and contractible, allowing the principal to treat agents separately through individualbased schemes (Itoh (1992) , Auriol et al. (2002) ). The incentive packages are derived in a linear principal-agent model (Holmström & Milgrom (1987) , Gibbons & Murphy (1992) ) and are based on explicit comparisons of team members' outputs. 6 The existing literature uses such contracts when the market shocks that hit agents' production are correlated. In our setting, market shocks are independent. However, as in Chalioti (2015) , individual outputs are correlated due to teamwork 6 Some principal-agent models allow both parties to hold some bargaining power (e.g., Pitchford (1998) ) while other models assume that either party can make a 'take-it-or-leave-it' o¤er (e.g., Mookherjee & Ray (2002) ). Bernhardt (1995) studies how the composition of an agent's skills and the non-observability of her ability a¤ect wage and promotion paths. Ferrer (2010) studies the e¤ects of lawyers'career concerns on litigation when the outcome of a trial depends on the opposing lawyers'e¤ort and abilities. Bilanakos (2013) argues that the provision of general training increases the worker's bargaining power vis-à-vis the employer.
interactions. Team-incentive contracts are the consequence of the e¢ cient use of information conveyed by both performance measures about an agent's e¤ort and ability.
The optimal contractual parameter based on an agent's own project output is always positive, indicating that higher agent performance is rewarded with a higher payment. However, the sign of the contractual parameter based on her teammate's output is less clear cut. If initiated interactions are large enough, the principal rewards the agent for the support she provides to her colleague.
In contrast, if the market and the principal anticipate that initiated interactions are small and an agent's contribution in her teammate's production is insigni…cant, the principal penalizes the agent when the teammate performs better by setting this contractual parameter negative. The principal now …lters out the e¤ect of teamwork interactions from agents' compensation. Implicit sabotage incentives now arise due to an agent's increasing willingness to persuade the principal that she is teamed with a less productive teammate. An agent wants to signal that she is the more productive team member in absolute and relative terms. In fact, an agent has implicit incentives to induce a downward readjustment of the market's assessment of her colleague's ability. This happens because a colleague's reputation cannot bene…t the agent. She is unable to capitalize on the increase in her colleague's bonus; it hurts her instead. In particular, if the teammate is perceived as being highly productive, the principal expects to pay a large part of the compensation through the contractual incentive components.
7 Given that individual remuneration is pinned down by the outside option, the …xed part of the salary will decrease, making an agent worse o¤.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on career concerns in teams where the ratchet e¤ect or sabotage incentives arise. Lazear (1989) considers sabotage incentives in tournaments that arise because explicit payments condition the reward of an agent negatively on her colleagues'performances. In Auriol et al. (2002) , explicit contracts are provided and the source of sabotage incentives is a lack of commitment by the principal. In a two-agent model, Meyer & Vickers (1997) use Holmström's (1999) production function where an agent's e¤ort and ability only matters for her own outcome. Thus, an agent cannot in ‡uence another's production. However, the learning process depends on whether agents' abilities are correlated. They argue that because there is a positive externality, each agent free-rides on the e¤ort of the other to enhance reputation. Due to free-riding, reputation incentives are weakened and the ratchet e¤ect arises. Agents have a decreasing willingness to work. In our setting, the teammates'innate characteristics are independent, but due to teamwork interactions, an agent has incentives to take action in order to a¤ect her teammates'performance.
Even if no explicit contracts are provided, an agent exerts e¤ort either to help her teammate or sabotage her by destroying some part of her production. Incentives to sabotage arise when the market puts a negative weight on a teammate's performance when predicting an agent's ability.
The literature on moral hazard problems remains narrow in its focus on whether market forces alone can remove them. Fama (1980) states that there will be no need for explicit contracts in order to solve the principal-agent con ‡icts. The market already provides e¢ cient implicit contracts, inducing the "right" level of labor supply. Holmström (1999) shows that risk-aversion and discounting place limitations on the market's ability to urge adequate incentives. However, if these limitations are lifted in a stationary model, agents exert e¢ cient e¤ort levels. Bar-Isaac & Hörner (2014) consider an agent who has di¤erent abilities -specialized and generalized abilities -to perform two tasks.
They compare the value of specializing with acting as a generalist in an in…nite-horizon model and …nd that, if there is no discounting, the stationary level of e¤ort is also e¢ cient. Bonatti & Hörner (2014) consider a dynamic framework with exponential learning. We show that in our model where teammates'abilities a¤ect their reputation incentives, the stationary levels of e¤orts on both tasks are ine¢ cient. The stationary work e¤ort is higher and the help e¤ort is lower than their e¢ cient levels. Thus, the work e¤ort is distorted upwards and the help e¤ort is distorted downwards.
This paper is also tied to the literature on team incentives when the degree of visibility of an agent's characteristics is an issue. In team production models, the market only observes the team output and uses this (single) measure to infer the level of workers'abilities. Ortega (2003) examines the e¤ect of the allocation of power within the …rm on workers'career concerns, where power confers visibility: as an agent becomes more visible, the visibility of her colleague must decline. He argues that uneven allocation of authority is optimal. Jeon (1996) shows the optimality of equal sharing of the team output among workers as well as the advantage of mixing young and old workers in a team.
Bar-Isaac (2007) analyzes workers'incentives to work for their own reputations when young but for their …rms' reputation when old. Arya & Mittendorf (2011) The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. It discusses the process of learning about abilities and the e¤ect of teamwork interactions on the amount of available information. Section 3 solves the game and derives teammates'reputation incentives in a setting where there is no explicit motivation. The optimal incentives to help or sabotage are analyzed. We also discuss the reputation incentives when market shocks are correlated. In section 4, we consider a multiperiod model and focus on the stationary level of labor supply. In section 5, we derive the optimal incentives when explicit contracts are also provided. Section 6 concludes.
The model
This section describes the model where no contingent contracts can be made and thus only reputation (implicit) incentives arise. We assume that there are two e¤ort-averse agents 1 and 2, indexed by i and j where i 6 = j. Agents are also rational and forward-looking. Employment lasts for two periods indexed by t = f1; 2g, and at each period, each agent carries out her own project.
Production technology
Agents are engaged in a stochastic production process. At each period t, agent i's "project" 
The teammate's innate ability, j , and her "help" e¤ort, a j t , increase agent i's project output in an additive way. Thus, each agent exerts work e¤ort to accomplish her own project as well as help e¤ort 8 Heterogeneous teams in terms of seniority or learning by doing are beyond the scope of this analysis. 9 Milgrom & Oster (1987) study the role of a worker's visibility in the job market: the abilities of visible workers are known to all parties while those of invisibles are concealed by an employer from other potential employers. Mukherjee (2008) examines a …rm's decision to disclose information about its workers'productivity.
to improve her colleague's performance. 10 When agent i enters the labor market, her ability is not known with certainty. However, all parties share the common prior that abilities are independently and identically distributed, where i is drawn from a normal distribution with mean m i 1 and variance 2 i . Prendergast & Topel (1996) consider i as the …t between the agent and her job that is contingent on some systemic variation, (symmetrically) unknown to all parties at each stage. 11 The parameter h j measures the degree of received teamwork interactions -the fraction of agent j's support that is appropriated by agent i -and h i indicates the degree of initiated interactions -the fraction of agent i's support that contributes to agent j's production. These parameters may di¤er. They are also exogenous and lie in [0; 1].
Teamwork interactions are value-creating and their intensity depends on the characteristics of the technology used by each agent or, for instance, the degree of tacit knowledge required in production.
The fact that h i and h j are less than one re ‡ects the imperfect nature of teamwork interactions:
providing help to a fellow member of the team is (somewhat) less productive than putting e¤ort into one's own task. The random terms " 
Learning process
In multi-agent career concerns models with uncorrelated shocks, the market updates from an agent's past performance in order to infer the level of her ability. In our model, teamwork interactions occur and support also depends on the ability of the fellow member. Since the unknown j enters agent i's production function, agent i's project output, z 
. Initiated interactions must be strong enough so that agent j's performance is sensitive to i , while received interactions, h j , must be weak (z Hence, a larger proportion of this z i 1 will also be attributed to j rather than i , so that E i j z i 1 ; z j 1 will decrease. In particular, if h i is small and the variance of j is large enough, it is more likely that both performance measures indicate the level of j . Thus, if both agents perform well, the market attributes these outcomes to high j , causing the estimate of i to be updated downwards. Agent j is now perceived as the high-quality member of the team. In the polar case where h i = 0, i does not contribute to agent j's project output at all. However, the market still uses this performance measure to draw valuable information about j (and indirectly about i ). Under these conditions, given z i 1 , the market always puts a negative weight on z j 1 to assess i : if h i = 0, ij 1 < 0 for all h j . To obtain better insight, we also examine how the variances of i and j a¤ect the weights the market puts on outputs in estimating teammates'abilities. In particular, we have: (i)
As long as initiated interactions are strong enough relative to the degree of received interactions so that a higher z i 1 or z j 1 is attributed to a higher i , an increase in the variance of agent i's ability, 2 i , will trigger the market to rely more on both signals. The market will be willing and able to learn more about i . On the other hand, we have: (i) i . An increase in 2 j now works in favor of agent i and induces the market to rely more on an agent's project output, z i 1 , to perceive the level of her ability, i . We have
The variance of agents'abilities and the degrees of teamwork interactions also a¤ect the "total" amount of available information in the market. Learning about abilities is captured by a decrease in the variance of the posterior estimate of the s, and thus by an increase in
where 1 is given in Lemma 1. The market can obtain a better estimate of agent i's ability as 2 i increases and 
[Figures 1 are about here.]
As h j increases, the joint signal z 
Agents'preferences and objectives
In carrying out her own task and providing support to her teammate, agent i incurs disutility that is task speci…c. The cost functions of work e¤ort and help e¤ort are (e i t ) and (a i t ), respectively. The function (:) is twice continuously di¤erentiable and convex, implying that there are diminishing returns to scale in the production process. We also assume that
The derivative with respect to h i gives
and lim a i t !1 0 (a i t ) = 1. Task-speci…c cost functions are used in multi-agent models as in Auriol et al. (2002), and Itoh (1992) . However, they are in stark contrast to other multitask models based on Holmström & Milgrom (1991) that assume (e i t + a i t ). In the latter models, the cross-partial derivatives with respect to two e¤orts are positive. That is, tasks are (perfect) substitutes in an agent's cost function. These total-e¤ort-cost functions introduce negative externalities between a given agent's tasks. As an agent increases the e¤ort devoted to one task, the marginal cost of e¤ort to the other task will grow larger. Thus, providing support to a teammate would be costly to an agent and it crowds out e¤ort directed to her own task, decreasing her own project output. Agents care for the sum of e¤ort exerted and the allocation of e¤ort between the tasks depends on the relative bene…ts an agent derives by these two tasks. In fact, the agent must equate the marginal return to e¤ort in both tasks. These models focus on the allocation of an agent's "attention" between the tasks.
In our model with task-speci…c-cost functions, disaggregated information, and separation of tasks -work e¤ort and help e¤ort are inputs in di¤erent production functions -bene…ts of providing help or sabotage emerge. Allocating a given total e¤ort to both tasks entails lower disutility. The cross-partial of the cost function is zero, hence the cost of exerting e¤ort to perform a given task is independent of the other task. An agent can focus on eliciting e¤ort to a¤ect her teammate's project output without having to consider simultaneously technologically founded externalities. Putting e¤ort in a task does not require e¤ort away from the other task. There are bene…ts from task-speci…c costs that can emerge exactly when there is separation of tasks and each teammate's project output is observable.
This cost function allows us to compare agents'e¤ort decisions for the same tasks and capture the results of in ‡uencing another agent's project output. Multitasking in the absence of crowding out e¤ects between the tasks keep a worker highly motivated to exert e¤ort in environments where career concerns are an issue.
Agent i receives the reward w i t and has constant absolute risk-averse (CARA) preferences. She derives utility
where r is the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion, r > 0. 15 This function is additively separable across periods, implying that agents behave as if they have access to perfect capital markets. They also do not discount the future.
Agent i's reward is determined in equilibrium and depends on the available information conveyed 15 Risk-aversion on the part of the agents is essential when explicit contracts are provided in order for the incentives parameters to be less than one (in absolute terms). Otherwise, the optimal contract will impose substantial human capital risk on the agents. If only implicit incentives arise, our results are also obtained with risk-neutrality; i.e., agent i's utility could be
We consider risk-aversion in order to be consistent in both settings.
by both agents'past performance measures.
16;17 A competitive market will set
Each agent receives a …xed payment equal to the reputational bonus she can claim for her contribution to both teammates'project outputs. This bonus is the total rent an agent can get by exerting e¤ort and providing support. Given the available information, her payment increases with an upward revision of the market's estimate of her own ability.
Reputation incentives
We now solve the two-period game and derive the teammates'optimal e¤orts. The conventional wisdom in career concerns models is that an agent works harder at the beginning of her career in order to improve her own performance and thus manipulate market assessments about her ability. We show that in our multi-agent model where an agent's ability inserts a fellow member's production function, additional reputation incentives arise. To in ‡uence the learning process, under certain conditions, an agent has incentives either to help or even to sabotage her colleague. Then, we perform this analysis when the output shocks are correlated.
Work and help e¤ort
In period 2, agent i receives w
However, this reward does not depend on her current actions. There are no career concerns and thus she exerts zero e¤ort: 
Career concerns arise because the levels of current project outputs, z i 1 and z j 1 , a¤ect the reputational bonus (wage) in the second period. As long as ability is unknown, there are returns to supplying labor, since past performances will in ‡uence the markets'perceptions about i . Labor is a substitute 16 The principals maximizes the sum of outputs minus the agents'payments. However, the competition among them will drive their pro…ts down to zero and each agent will receive her reputational bonus. 17 Recall that t = f1; 2g. If employment lasts for T periods where T > 2, the market's perceptions of abilities will depend on all past performances. The reputational bonus will be w
for ability. Thus, by increasing labor supply, an agent can potentially bias the process of inference in her favor. Proposition 1 presents the optimal e¤orts.
18
Proposition 1 (Career concerns) In equilibrium, agent i has reputation (implicit) incentives to work, increasing her own project output, as well as to help or sabotage her teammate's production:
where ii 1 and ij 1 are given in Lemma 1.
The optimal e¤orts are contingent on the measures that the market uses to draw inferences about ability. In line with the literature, career concerns depend on the weight the market puts on outputs in estimating ability. However, we argue that what also matters for career concerns is how many components of the production process and the learning process an agent can a¤ect in order to manipulate the market's perceptions in her favor and how many "pieces" of future remuneration depend on an agent's current actions. By exerting work e¤ort in the current period and providing support, an agent a¤ects both teammates'performance measures, z i 1 and z j 1 , in order to induce an upward revision of the market's estimate of her own ability. Thus, an agent has two tools available to use to shape the market's assessments. In Auriol et al. (2002) where the support an agent receives depends only on her teammate's e¤ort (not on her ability) and the market shocks are not correlated, market assessments about agent i's ability only depend on her own performance. Thus, providing support has no e¤ect on an agent's future remuneration. Agent i's utility-maximizing help e¤ort is zero. Her work e¤ort is equal to (1 + h i ) h i ij 1 through help or sabotage. In particular, if initiated interactions are strong enough (large h i ) relative to the degree of received interactions h j so that ij 1 > 0, agent i anticipates that good teammate performance (high z j 1 ) will entail an upward revision of the market's estimate of her own ability, i . Therefore, she has additional incentives to help her colleague, M ij 1 > 0. However, for a small h i so that ij 1 < 0, such reputation incentives are reversed, M ij 1 < 0. If initiated interactions are weak, a higher z j 1 is attributed to j and the market updates its assessments about i downwards. Thus, by helping a teammate to further increase her project output, agent i will induce market inferences to be revised against her. Instead, a bad performance by her teammate will be a good signal about her own ability.
18 One can consider the normalization z
t for any i and j. The reputational bonus now is E
This normalization serves to guarantee that agents tend to put e¤ort in both tasks exactly in order to manipulate market's perceptions rather than because the "pie" gets larger by helping a teammate. Qualitatively, all our results also hold in this setting. The optimal work e¤ort will satisfy 0 e
and the optimal help e¤ort is given by
, which can be either positive or negative.
A decrease in z j 1 will increase agent i's reputation so that she now has incentives to sabotage her colleague. We can interpret negative e¤ort as hiding, stealing or even destroying some part of a teammate's project output. In the polar case where "one-way" teamwork interactions occur -h i > 0 while h j = 0 -agent i always has incentives to help. This analysis boils down to the following: agent i has stronger reputation incentives as more pieces of information during the learning process depend on current actions and as the impact of the estimate of i on future remuneration increases. An agent always has incentives to exert work e¤ort in order to increase her own project output. As long as a teammate's performance is sensitive to agent's own ability so that ij 1 > 0, we argue that this agent has additional incentives to help her colleague in order to build up her reputation. In contrast, if the impact of an agent's support to her teammate's performance is insigni…cant so that the market puts a negative weight on her teammate's output to estimate her ability, We can also compare the teammates'e¤ort decisions, given the di¤erences in the variance of their abilities. 19 In particular, if received and initiated interactions are identical, h i = h j , the agent with the higher variance of ability, say The market anticipates that this agent's e¤orts are key determinants of both project outputs and relies more on both signals that likely re ‡ect the level of her ability. 
Correlated output shocks
We analyze the reputation incentives when the transitory shocks, " 
for any h i , h j and 2 " . 20 One can also consider the degrees of teamwork interactions to be decision variables; i.e., agents decide how much they will appropriate from a teammate's support. Agent i's "appropriation" e¤ort, (say) b i t , and j are multiplicative, 
for any i and j. Dewatripont et al. (1999) assume that agent i's (work) e¤ort is multiplied with her 'own'ability, and thus career concerns depend only on the mean of i , and not on j as in our setting.
in production. 21 Now, there are two "forms" of correlation between the team members' project outputs: one due to teamwork interactions and one due to the correlation of the random terms. Given the realized performances z i 1 and z j 1 , the correlation coe¢ cients of the (conditional) distribution of
where In settings where there is some degree of asymmetry in performance measures -i.e., h i , h j or are less than one -the correlation coe¢ cient e ii 1 is always positive, e ii 1 > 0. Given the teammate's performance, an agent's higher project output is attributed to her own higher ability and vice versa. However, the e¤ect of an increase in on e ii 1 and thus on the intensity of an agent's (utility-maximizing) work e¤ort, e harder to perceive the levels of the s. Thus, as increases, the market can better identify whether 21 For instance, one can consider a team that produces hard disks but the team members use di¤erent technologies; i.e., magnetic and holographic. A market shock may hit the output of the projects that are based on these two technologies in a di¤erent way.
22 Under the assumption that the outputs signal the level of teammates'abilities or are in ‡uenced by marketwide factors.
This analysis highlights that given the available information, a larger will discourage agent i to exert work e¤ort if this increase leads to a worse market estimate of i . More precisely, an increase in a small > 0 will decrease agent i's optimal work e¤ort when initiated interactions, h i , are strong enough while received interactions, h j , are weak:
Meyer & Vickers (1997) also examine the relationship between reputation incentives and the correlation of the output shocks. They consider a two-agent setting in which each agent's output depends only on her own e¤ort and ability, as in Holmström (1999) . They …nd that when agents' output shocks are correlated (while their abilities are independent), a larger correlation , where > 0, leads an agent to exert higher e¤ort, e e i 1 , in order to increase her reputation. There is a negative externality and some rivalry between agents. The observation of another agent's outcome exactly reduces the variance of the "noise" and allows the market to rely more on an agent's performance to infer the level of her own ability. 23 This e¤ect is also present in our setting where teamwork interactions occur. However, we argue that this relationship can turn out to be negative when h i is large enough while h j is small, where an increase in induces the market to decrease the weight it puts on agent i's project output to perceive the level of her ability.
The sign of e ij 1 is also not clear cut. It depends on the relative intensity of the two forms of correlation between the project outputs. For e ij 1 to be positive, initiated interactions, h i , must be su¢ ciently large in order for i to be a key determinant of z j 1 . For instance, if the market shocks vary substantially (high 2 " ) and are negatively correlated, < 0, e ij 1 is more "likely" to be positive. A high realization of z i 1 should be associated with a low z j 1 . However, if agent j's project output is also high, this is attributed to high i , especially for relatively intensive initiated interactions h i . In turn, agent i cashes in an increase in her reputational bonus due to a higher z j 1 and thus, she has incentives to help her fellow member. In a setting where the random shocks are positively correlated, > 0, but exceeds h i , > h i , then e ij 1 is negative. This happens because the contribution of i in z j 1 is relatively small and high 23 Meyer & Vickers (1997) argue that this relationship between reputation incentives and the correlation of the output shocks is the counterpart of the insurance e¤ect in a static principal-agent model where "comparative performance information" compensation schemes are provided. The observation of another agent's output increases the precision with which an agent's e¤ort is estimated, leading the principal to provide additional motivation.
teammates' project outputs are mainly attributed to market factors. The market believes that the teammates act in a favorable environment and updates its assessments about i downwards.
Therefore, there is some rivalry between the agents and incentives to sabotage arise.
Multiperiod models
We now focus on career concerns when employment extends to many periods and the output shocks are uncorrelated. We also use a stationary model as in Holmström (1999) to examine whether the equilibrium e¤orts are e¢ cient under the assumption that the quality of a fellow member of a team matters for an agent's reputation.
The T-period case
At each period t, the market's assessments of abilities now depend on the history of agent i's and j's project outputs z 
where
j . In line with the literature, the signal ii is always positive but decreasing in . The returns to an agent's work e¤ort are bigger the more uncertainty there is about her ability. Thus, early in the process when there is less available information, the market puts more weight on the most recent output observation when updating its assessments about i . Eventually, i will be revealed almost completely and new output observations will have little impact on market perceptions. For small h i , the presence of teamwork interactions slows down the learning process about i . However, agent i's attempts to in ‡uence output are only temporarily e¤ective (only early in career). In this multi-period setting, the signal ij deserves special attention. (1
The signal ij may even switch signs, from positive to negative, as increases. Note that although the variance of a performance measure depends on the variance of its transitory shocki.e., var (z " ), implying that over the periods, the noise introduced by teammates'abilities matters more in the learning process and for reputation incentives.
Thus, even when teamwork interactions are such that the market puts a positive weight on agent j's project outputs to infer the level of i early in the process, as performance observations accumulate, ij diminishes. At later stages of an agent's career, as j becomes key in predicting i , this signal can turn out to be negative. As the market learns more about j by observing z j t , agent i's reputation incentives reverse and, in fact, she has incentives to sabotage. Even if early in the process an agent has incentives to help her colleague, sabotage incentives can arise for those agents who are about to retire.
The stationary case
We now investigate the relationship between the intensity of reputation incentives over time and the e¢ cient level of e¤orts in a stationary setting where teammates' abilities remain unknown to the parties. In this setting, we can examine whether agents'desire to shape market perceptions in order to increase future remuneration can induce them to exert the "right" level of e¤orts. We also need to assume that the agents discount the future by some factor . For higher , agents put a lower weight on the future and thus value the "delayed" payments less. Provided that career concerns arise exactly because of agents'attempts to increase their reputation, seeking higher future monetary payments, such incentives will be stronger in a setting with no discounting. However, the presence of discounting in this analysis will allow for additional insights on whether the market forces alone can remove the moral hazard problems and provide adequate incentives for workers to perform.
In line with the literature based on Holmström (1999), we assume that the ability ‡uctuates over the agents'working life, according to the process 
The learning process becomes 
= (1 +
In period 1, we have 0 (e i 1 ) to be given by the sum of the terms
In the stationary case where
where the sum in the brackets is equal to 1 1 i . This analysis gives the stationary work and help e¤ort levels:
Holmström (1999) formalizes Fama's (1980) major conclusion that the market induces the agents to exert the e¢ cient e¤ort levels. In a single-agent model, he shows that this happens if there is no discounting. We argue that in our model where the team members interact and an agent's individual performance depends on the quality of her team, even if there is no discounting, for h i > 0, Fama's conclusion generically fails. The stationary levels of e¤orts are above or below their e¢ cient levels.
We perform this analysis by discussing …rst the only two cases where teammates'stationary e¤ort levels are also e¢ cient in our model.
Under full information (…rst-best), agent i's remuneration is a …xed payment equal to the sum of the disutilities of work and help e¤orts, (e = h i , respectively. The …rst-best reward at each period t is the reward that is optimal in a one-shot game.
Agent i's stationary work and help e¤orts are e¢ cient as long as there is no discounting, = 1, and an agent's ability does not a¤ect her teammate's project output, h i = 0, as in Holmström (1999) and Auriol et al. (2002) , although received interactions may occur, h j > 0 (agent j's stationary e¤orts will be ine¢ cient). Therefore, b ij as a signal should play no role in agent i's reputation decisions.
In turn, the stationary work e¤ort is e¢ cient and equal to one: 0 (e i ) = 0 e i;f b t = 1. Since an agent's help e¤ort does not a¤ect the process of inference about her own ability, any incentive to in ‡uence a teammate's performance disappears. Exerting zero help e¤ort in a stationary model is also e¢ cient:
It is rather striking that in our model where teammates'abilities matter for reputation concerns, the stationary e¤ort levels can also be e¢ cient as long as the initiated and received interactions are perfect, h i = h j = 1. Now, providing help to a colleague is as productive as putting e¤ort into one's own task. An agent's help and work e¤orts weight equally to both performance measures. Under full information, the e¢ cient e¤ort levels are given by In the stationary case where h j < 1, for any h i , an agent's work e¤ort is higher and help e¤ort is lower than its e¢ cient level. Agent i has incentives to distort her work e¤ort upwards in order to signal that she is of higher ability and induce the market to revise its beliefs in her favor. The stationary reputation incentives indicate that an agent is oriented to exert more work e¤ort in order to improve her own performance, rather than to focus on helping or sabotaging her colleague. The optimal a i is distorted downwards. Thus, agents will overprovide work e¤ort and underprovide help e¤ort. For small initiated interactions such that b ij < 0, the stationary level of help e¤ort can even be negative, while its e¢ cient level is always positive.
To complete this analysis, we also need to examine the convergence to the stationary state. We need to explore reputation incentives before a stationary state is reached. In Holmström (1999) , learning follows the process m 
Explicit contracts
We now examine career concerns in the presence of teamwork interactions when explicit contracts are provided and employment lasts for two periods. 24 We assume that the agents are appointed by a risk-neutral and pro…t-seeking principal. Their project outputs are observable and contractible, allowing the principal to deal with each agent separately as in Itoh (1991 Itoh ( , 1992 . The principal and agents interact and play the two-period game described in Figure 4 .
Period 1 Contracting stage:
The principal simultaneously makes a contract o¤er to each teammate.
! Production stage:
If the agent accepts the o¤er, she chooses e¤ort levels, e i 1 and a i 1 . Events beyond the agents'control occur, the outputs are determined, and the rewards are received.
! Period 2 Contracting stage:
All parties observe 1st-period outputs and update their beliefs. A new contract o¤er is made to each teammate.
! Production stage:
If the agent stays in the …rm, she makes e¤ort choices, e i 2 and a i 2 . The outputs are realized and the contracts are executed. 
Principal' s problem
The contracts depend linearly on both agents' project outputs since the latter are correlated due to teamwork interactions. Holmström & Milgrom (1987) establish that in a model much like the single-period version of this model (but lacking the uncertainty about an agent's ability), the optimal contract is linear. 25 Gibbons & Murphy (1992) , in a single-agent model, and Auriol et al. (2002) , in their multi-agent framework, also consider contracts that are linear in outputs.
Holmström (1999) also argues that, for a risk-neutral agent whose payo¤ is linear in the posterior belief about her ability, there is no divergence between the agent's e¤ort decision to build up reputation and the …rst best, provided that the market can observe her project output. Reputation incentives distort the agent's e¤ort away from …rst best only if she is risk averse or the production technology is nonlinear in agent's ability so that the process of inference about her ability is also nonlinear. The intuition is as follows. Assuming linear contracts, the agent's expected payment is exactly based on the prior assessment of her ability. Thus, a risk-neutral agent is willing to exert the "right" level of e¤ort from the principal's perspective. Reputation incentives matter only if the agent is risk averse or her wage is nonlinear in the posterior of her ability. Both these assumptions 24 The model where employment lasts for T periods is solved in Appendix (A:5).
25 Holmström & Milgrom (1987) show that in a static version of their dynamic model, the optimal compensation scheme that is o¤ered to an agent with CARA preferences is a linear function of the performance measures. serve to guarantee that there is no symmetry between the risk faced by the …rm and the risk face by the agent. Gibbons & Murphy (1992) consider explicit payments and state that risk-aversion is necessary so that optimal contracts do not completely eliminate career concerns. In particular, a risk-averse agent wishes to be insured against low realizations of her project output, and thus weaker explicit incentives are provided. Given that explicit payments will decrease, reputation incentives will increase.
Relative performance evaluations provide a richer information base on which to write contracts and allow the principal to better assess agent i's e¤orts and ability. Teamwork interactions necessitate the use of two-piece rate contracts, which promote e¢ ciency in designing incentives. In particular, we assume that, at each period t, the principal o¤ers contracts of the form C 
where ! i t denotes the …xed salary component and i t , i t are the incentive parameters. Such "teamincentive" schemes introduce either cooperation or competition between the teammates, depending on the sign of i t . As in Gibbons & Murphy (1992) and Auriol et al. (2002) , we also assume that side-contracts between agents are not possible and long-term (multiperiod) contracts are not feasible. 26 In particular, the second-period contracts depend implicitly on z i 1 and z j 1 rather than explicitly through commitment at the beginning of the …rst period. That is, at each period, agents choose the most attractive contract o¤ers. This assumption also allows us to derive the substitutive relationship between implicit and explicit incentives: the contractual incentives should be strong when reputation incentives are weak.
In case that an agent rejects the contract o¤er, she receives an outside option that equals her reputational bonus e i t , given by equation (3). 27 Competing employers cannot make a better o¤er than e i t . The principal is equally well-o¤ by hiring either a high reputation agent at a high wage or a low reputation agent at a low wage. This bargaining outcome can arise as the equilibrium of an extensive-form game. In this game, an agent is randomly assigned to a prospective principal and queues with the other job applicants. The principal makes a contract o¤er to the …rst agent in line.
If the agent accepts the o¤er, she works for this principal. Otherwise, the agent queues for another job and the principal makes an o¤er to the next agent in line. Therefore, each agent receives only 26 If a principal can commit herself to a second-period salary before the observation of the …rst-period outputs, the principal succeeds in insulating an agents' expected life-time compensation from the uncertainty she faces with respect to all team members' true abilities. An agent's problem is identical in each period. However, in our model, the principal cannot commit to such long-term schemes. A new contract is o¤ered in every period, after observing the realizations of past performances. Such contracts will depend on these observations and reputation incentives will arise.
27 Gibbons & Murphy (1992) , Holmström (1999) , among others, assume that the agent has all the bargaining power, and thus the principal maximizes subject to a zero-pro…t condition. In a multi-agent setting, this assumption would be problematic. Following Auriol et al. (2002) , we consider a bargaining process that e¤ectively makes each teammate the residual claimant only to her reputational bonus. One can also verify that if we set i 2 = i 2 = 0, the equilibrium implicit incentives in our setting (derived in subsection 5:2) are as in Proposition 1. her reputational bonus that arises due to work and support provision.
The principal is the residual claimant on …rm's net pro…ts, which equal the sum of the project outputs net of agents'compensations. In a two-period model, given the available information, the principal's problem becomes max C i t ;e i t ;a i t ;C j t ;e j t ;a
The incentive compatibility constraints, IC i e;t and IC i a;t , guarantee that, in each period t, an agent chooses the (expected) utility maximizing e¤orts. The individual rationality constraint (IR i t ) shows that the agent will participate in the production process only if her expected utility of doing so exceeds her outside option. We recursively solve this game. 
Equilibrium explicit incentives
In period 2, agent i maximizes the certainty equivalent of her utility that takes the mean-variance
(a 
Each agent also accepts the contract that allows her to earn (at least) her reputational bonus: in equilibrium, the IR i 2 constraint is binding. The principal signs the most appealing contracts. Thus, agent i's base payment is
where the conditional variance of the wage is
28 In this multi-agent framework, the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) and the convexity of the distribution function condition (CDFC) are not su¢ cient for the …rst-order approach to be valid as in a single-agent setting. Itoh (1991) argues that, in a model with cross-agent interactions, a generalized CDFC for the joint probability distribution of the outputs is needed and the wage schemes must be nondecreasing. The coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion must also not decline too fast. Our model with agents'CARA preferences, linear contracts and production technologies satis…es all these assumptions and thus the …rst-order approach applies.
The (8), (9) and (10), we derive the second period explicit incentives:
Proposition 3 (Relative performance evaluation) In the second period, the optimal (a) pay-for-own-performance incentive parameter is positive, i 2 > 0, for all h i and h j ; (b) pay-for-teammate-performance incentive parameter is negative, i 2 < 0, and thus, agent i has incentives to sabotage if and only if the degree of risk aversion is small enough so that
The positive sign of i 2 indicates that an agent's higher own project output is compensated with a higher wage. The sign of i 2 is less straightforward. The principal sets i 2 positive for low degrees of risk aversion and strong initiated interactions (high h i ) so that i 2 > 0, giving the agent a long position in her teammate's performance. The principal anticipates the support an agent provides to her colleague and rewards her when the teammate does better. The "compensation ratio"
is also higher in compensation packages that are rewritten to accommodate an increasing h i . The higher h i is, the more valuable is the information conveyed by the colleague's project output, and thus the use of relative performance evaluations becomes more essential. Such evaluation schemes can e¤ectively be used as means of internalizing the positive e¤ects of providing support. In contrast, for a high risk averse agent, if the initiated interactions are weak (low h i ), i 2 becomes negative: due to risk-sharing and the fact that agent i's contribution in her teammate's project output is insigni…cant, the principal infers that agent j is the high productivity worker in the team and penalizes agent i as z j 2 increases. By setting i 2 negative, the principal …lters out the teamwork interactions from agent i's compensation. Recall also that the optimal i 2 is such that it minimizes the variance of agent i's wage. In fact, for substantially high risk averse agents, it is likely the variance of her wage w In period 1, agent i anticipates the implicit dependence of the second-period wage on the …rst-period project outputs and maximizes
where V ar f e w (9), we have
Agents are motivated by the total explicit incentives from the …rst-period contract and the implicit incentives from career concerns. In particular, current e¤ort only a¤ects the intercept of future wage
2 . This is because there are no wealth e¤ects in agents'utility and the production functions are additive. Both agents have the same marginal product of e¤ort regardless of their true ability. In turn, the second-period explicit incentives . If initiated interactions are strong so that i 2 > 0, the principal anticipates that agent i will be assessed as being of higher ability and the explicit incentive component of her future remuneration will be large. Thus, the principal o¤ers a contract whose base payment increases by less than the increase in the agent's reputational bonus. However, if h i is small so that i 2 < 0, the principal now perceives that the explicit incentive component in the second period will also be small and does not lower the …xed part of the salary as much.
Implicit incentives also arise due to help e¤ort provision, captured by M ij 1 . As long as agent i's contribution in a teammate's project output is signi…cant (high h i ) so that ij 1 > 0, by undertaking more help e¤ort in the …rst period, a i 1 , agent i gains from an improvement in her teammate's performance and thus from the subsequent increase in her own reputational bonus e i 2 . In particular, an increase in z j 1 will make agent i better o¤, since the principal will infer that agent i is a high productivity agent. Thus, agent i has positive (reputation) implicit incentives to help. Such incentives decrease by It is in agent i's interest to convince the principal that she is teamed with a lower productivity agent and thus she has implicit incentives to sabotage. However, if i 2 < 0, the second period explicit incentives now diminish agent i's appetite to sabotage. By setting i 2 negative, the principal now makes agent i less interested in destroying part of her teammate's output in order to build up her own reputation. Thus, a negative i 2 encourages agent i to focus more on her own project in the …rst-period rather than sabotaging her teammate in her attempt to shape market assessments about her ability. From the principal's perspective, career motives can be either bene…cial or detrimental.
Sabotage incentives also arise in Auriol et al. (2002) . However, the context and intuition di¤er. In their model, agent i's higher work e¤ort increases only the conditional priors of her own ability, while her help e¤ort decreases the expectations about her colleague's ability. Thus, an agent's reputation incentives are straightforward: she wants to induce an upward revision of the market's estimate of i and a downward revision of the estimate of j . Provided that agent i does not internalize any bene…ts of an increase in the estimate of j and her remuneration is determined by her outside option, the optimal help e¤ort is always negative due to explicit motivation. In particular, the optimal …rst-period work e¤ort, e i 1 , depends exclusively on i 2 , while the optimal a i 1 depends exclusively on i 2 ; i.e., using the same notation,
, where i;AF P 2 > 0 and i;AF P 2 > 0. However, in our model, additional incentives arise, either through agents' attempts to increase their reputation or though explicit motivation. The reputation incentives that emerge through changes in a teammate's performance and are captured by
can even be positive.
Agents'incentives also di¤er from those in Lazear (1989) where sabotage incentives arise in tournaments because an agent's compensation is conditioned negatively on her colleagues'performances.
Using such schemes, agents may want to destroy other workers'output rather than to work hard on their own project. In our model, the optimal i 2 can be positive. However, even if i 2 > 0, as long as ij 1 is negative, agent i has implicit incentives to sabotage. This result is also di¤erent from Meyer & Vickers (1997) where the agents'abilities are correlated and implicit incentives are weakened due to the ratchet e¤ect.
The decomposition of the equilibrium incentive parameters in the …rst period gives where
(see Appendix (A:4)). The coe¢ cients i 1 and i 1 are positive and less than one. We use this decomposition of the optimal explicit incentives in order to examine the underlying e¤ects (this analysis is generalized in a T -period model, analyzed in Appendix (A:5)). There is the noise reduction e¤ect that arises due to changes in the "amount" of available information about ability. In the next period, as the market learns more about abilities and their conditional variance decreases, we have i 1 > i 2 . Therefore, the optimal trade-o¤ between incentive provision and insurance becomes better for the principal (over time), in the sense that lower risks are incurred and a higher-power explicit incentive, i 2 , can be provided:
. Higher h i shifts the incentive-insurance trade-o¤ towards the former even more.
The principal also adjusts the optimal explicit incentives to account for agents'reputation incentives. Given that M ii 1 > 0, the principal imposes a lower pay-for-own performance relation when the optimal implicit incentives to work are stronger. Similarly, for high h i so that M Risk-aversion and uncertainty about abilities also induce each agent to require insurance against low realizations of both i and j : the own-performance and teammate-performance (human capital) insurance e¤ects arise. In particular, the principal o¤ers a contract that insures the agents against the intertemporal risk they face. For large initiated interactions so that both in the …rst period. In the absence of teamwork interactions as in Gibbons & Murphy (1992) , the teammate-performance human capital insurance e¤ect does not hold.
The compensation ratio e¤ect re ‡ects the relationship between the "e¤ective" incentives -the sum of the explicit and implicit incentives -agent i is in ‡uenced by. We have
, which is positive when the initiated interactions are strong enough so that the principal …nds it optimal to induce cooperation between the teammates. For low h i so that i 1 becomes negative, the principal induces competition between them. 31 30 The own-performance and teammate-performance human capital insurance e¤ects can be separated because agents' project outputs are observable and relative performance evaluation schemes are used. If learning is based on an aggregate measure and wages are contingent on the team production, these two e¤ects are merged. 31 Assuming that long-term contracts are not feasible is equivalent to assuming that long-term contracts exist but must be Pareto e¢ cient at each period. Gibbons & Murphy (1992) show that a sequence of (optimal) short-term contracts provides exactly the same incentives as the optimal renegotiation-proof long-term contract. This result also holds in our model where the optimal pay-for-own and pay-for-teammate incentive parameters of the renegotiation-
Conclusion
We examine career concerns in teams in a setting where there are interactions between the fellow members of a team and the help an agent receives depends on both her colleagues'e¤ort and innate ability. Teamwork interactions a¤ect the learning process and are at the heart of this analysis. By exerting e¤ort and providing support, an agent can a¤ect both her own and her teammate's project output. Thus, she can use both performance measures to induce the market to revise its assessment about her own ability upwards.
We show that career concerns depend on how many signals the agent can a¤ect in order to manipulate the market's inference. In particular, we argue that if initiated interactions are substantial so that an agent's support is a key determinant of her teammate's production, the agent has incentives to work and help her colleague. By providing support, an agent can signal that she is a high-productivity agent. In contrast, if initiated interactions are weak and received interactions are intensive so that the market updates its beliefs about an agent's ability downwards when the colleague performs well, sabotage incentives arise. This happens because an agent's higher help e¤ort increases a teammate's performance, which biases the process of inference against her. Thus, the agent has incentives to sabotage her teammate in order to signal that she is of higher ability and increase her reputation. In a stationary model where we add uncertainty into the performance measures in order for abilities to remain unknown, initiated interactions induce the agents to supply work e¤ort above its e¢ cient level and help e¤ort below its e¢ cient level. The optimal implicit incentives are distorted as long as teamwork interactions are imperfect and there is no discounting. This model can be used to analyze reputation incentives of team workers when their individual performance is observable and depends on the quality of fellow members. This is likely to happen in research collaborations, sports or …nance reams. There are also extensions and directions for future work that are of special interest, using the present model as a reference point. For instance, one can consider di¤erences in the mean of the distribution of teammates'ability and address the question of whether a researcher has incentives to be teamed with senior or junior colleagues. We can also assume that a worker contributes to multiple projects and is teamed with di¤erent workers in each of them. We can then examine if she has incentives to work in projects where teammates' ability is more visible or in projects where teammates are of lower productivity. The size of the team with heterogeneous workers is another key determinant of career concerns. For instance, biotechnology requires large teams and may lack the ability to break up large projects into small independent modules, as is possible in the software industry. 
Following DeGroot (1970) , after the observation of z 
A.2 Convergence to the stationary e¤ort levels
We …rst elaborate the dynamics of the learning process. The sequence of . If
2
" is su¢ ciently larger than 2 so that l i is close to zero, the stationary level i is close to 1, implying that learning occurs slowly. In contrast, if 
The sign of each term in equation (17) is a decreasing sequence, the convergence of fa i t g is from above. We can perform the same analysis to examine the convergence to the stationary level of help .
We also derive . We can derive the contractual parameters of the contracts that are o¤ered in each period. These optimal parameters change monotonically with t. They indicate that greater motivation is provided explicitly over the periods, while reputation incentives decrease for those about to retire. . In all three …gures, it is also assumed that h j = 1. 
